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Tunisia’s not Talking

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A Tunisian man pays for his coffee with Tunisian dinar bills bearing slogans calling for the Ennahda party to step down from power. (Fethi Belaid/AFP/Getty Images)

A Tunisian man pays for his coffee with Tunisian dinar bills bearing slogans calling for the Ennahda party to step down from power. (Fethi Belaid/AFP/Getty Images)

Tunisia’s political scene has been practically paralyzed ever since the assassination of opposition leader Mohamed Brahmi in late July. Meanwhile, the country’s economic recovery has come to a standstill and terrorism has claimed the lives of a large number of servicemen, policemen and border guards. On October 25, Tunisia’s national dialogue began, spearheaded by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Industry, Trade and Handicrafts Union (UTICA), the National Association of Lawyers, and the League for the Defense of Human Rights. The dialogue brought together the ruling Islamists and leaders of the opposition in the hope that they could bring an end to the country’s deepening political crisis, but it was suspended less than two weeks later.

It had been difficult for the UGTT and its union partners to forge an agreement between the different political factions over the national dialogue. After all other attempts had been exhausted, the UGTT and the UTICA produced a new roadmap for the talks consisting of the resignation of the governing troika comprised of Ennahda, the Congress for the Republic party (CPR) and Ettakatol; the acceleration of the work of the constituent assembly; and legislative and presidential elections to limit the duration of the transitional period. Even as Ennahda reluctantly agreed to the terms, the CPR refused to sign the document.

After the assassination of Brahmi, the opposition sought to bring down the transitional process, which they could only achieve through the dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC). In late July more than seventy opposition deputies withdrew from the assembly and joined a sit-in calling for its disbandment. The opposition’s newfound unity has enabled them to mobilize supporters, and it has transformed them into a national and international pressure group. Subsequently, an ANC spokesman from the Ettakatol party announced the suspension of the assembly’s activities until the government and opposition could agree to a dialogue.

The opposition was later influenced by the unions to drop the idea of ‘”torpedoing” the transition process, and to focus instead on dissolving the government. Ennahda saw this as a conspiratorial move, since targeting the government also meant targeting Ennahda’s share of power in the ruling coalition. They initially refused to join talks. But, over time, with the increasing political pressure and the decline of the economy, Ennahda was persuaded to come to the table.

There are very real questions remaining over Ennahda’s desire for reform, as well as their willingness to withdraw from government to attempt to return through new elections. Even if the dialogue eventually leads to an endorsement of a new government and acceleration in ratifying the constitution and electoral process in the constituent assembly, the troika still holds a majority. This means Ennahda could potentially suspend the negotiations by throwing up barriers or having deputies loyal to the troika announce a rebellion against their parties’ involvement in the dialogue.

Ennahda’s possible motivation for suspending the negotiations, or at least preventing them from achieving their goals, is that their resignation might be seen as an opportunity by the opposition to enact revenge. There have already been many cases raised in the courts against the party’s ministers (including Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh himself, who announced in October his intention to resign once an interim government could be selected) and there could be repercussions for many involved. For the Ennahda movement, it has become clear that the centers of its influence will not support a step down from power.

From the start, Tunisians tried to be optimistic that the political forces in their country would succeed in finding a positive way out of the crisis. Now, everything seems to indicate the opposite. The groups chairing the talks have no real power over the politicians. They are merely mediators, and the roadmap does not give them the authority to resolve disputes. Even if the talks were to resume and the parties involved succeed in nominating a new prime minister, the president could refuse to appoint the nominee. The constituent assembly could refuse to recognize the new government. And the government’s promise to resign will not be fulfilled unless the dialogue is completed.

Despite all of this, it is still possible to have hope in the wisdom of Tunisia’s leaders and the desire of all political parties to overcome their differences and complete the transition to democracy.

All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.


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